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COMMENTS
and mortgage corporations have not long ago caused serious agitation for the
revocation of this principle.
Three possible solutions seem apparent, each of which would be entirely corrective of the situation.
If all county registry offices were equipped with "lot and block" systems of
indices, the principle could be maintained and its glaring impracticality abolished.
But this solution itself is impractical. The tremendous and prohibitive cost for
surveying and mapping the entire state immediately vetoes this solution. Not
only the cost itself, but the question upon whom such responsibility should
descend would cause such a political hassle that the plan would be defeated before
its inception.
The second solution would be for the legislature specifically to amend the recording act to protect only grantees and mortgagees (as relates to this problem)
who record their indentures at a time when their grantors or mortgagors are
seized and record owners of the premises in question. A failure to record during
this period would deny such recordation any constructive notice to any purchaser
for value without actual notice of such conveyance or mortgage. Such a purchaser under the specific change of the act and by virtue of the statute would
take free of the pre-existing equities between his grantor and said grantor's
grantee or mortgagee of the property which was after-acquired.
The third solution, and perhaps the easiest, would be for the New York Court
of Appeals to take sharp issue with its prior decisions on this subject, and declare
that such decisions are in clear contradiction to at least the intent of the recording act, and as such should be overruled. Such a decision could embody principles
recommended in the preceding paragraph.
That any of these recommended changes are near at hand is doubtful. But
perhaps this review will serve to bring to light a problem of which oftentimes
many persons engaged in the legal aspects of realty transactions are not immediately aware. As regards real property, the principle of "caveat emptor" has lost
none of its stinging force in New York and the courts of this state.

LIBEL IN A WILL
THE PROBLEM

Ever since a well-known seventeenth century English rou6 bequeathed legacies
to those ladies who spurned his attentions' testators have been known to use
their wills in a dual capacity, both to dispose of their estates and also their
animosities. It is both convenient and effective for a testator to take this opportunity to defame someone who has incurred his displeasure since its effect will
not be felt until after his death. After the instrument has been admitted to
probate the libel contained therein is a matter of public record to be republished
1. The dtation of this case has been lost in antiquity but it was noted by Surrogate
Wingate in Matter of Draske's Estate, 160 isc. 587, 589, 290 N.Y. Supp. 581, 584 (Surf.
Ct. 1936).
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whenever recourse to the will is necessary. What, if anything, may be done
to mitigate the consequences of the libel and the existence of liability for
damages thus caused form the subject of this comment.
THE LAiLITy OF THE ESTATE

The tort of libel is predicated upon an injury to the reputation of the party
defamed in a writing or in some other permanent form. Since only the opinion
of others can form the reputation of another no cause of action can arise unless
the libelous imputation is communicated. The communication of the defamatory
matter is called publication, without which the tort of libel has not been consummated. 3 Either the defamatory remarks in the will of the testator have been
published or the estate is not liable. A publication does result, however, if the
will is admitted to probate since it is then a matter of court record. 4 If real
estate has been devised publication will result to all those who search the title.0
As to whether or not a testator can posthumously cause publication the courts
have held that if he drew the will with the intention and knowledge that after
his death his statement would be publicized he is responsible for its publication. 0
His liability therefore can be inferred from the setting in motion of the procedure
designed to achieve the contemplated result. A request on the part of the testator
to have his will filed with the court can be implied from the fact of its execution
and it is generally accepted that one who requests the publication of defamatory
matter which he furnishes and which is actually published, is liable for his act 7
in much the same manner as one who supplies defamatory matter to a newspaper
reporter.8 As regards the executor the authorities agree that although the testator
has procured the publication through him, he is not the agent of the testator for
that purpose.9
2. Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 162 S.W. 584 (1914). It was stated that
there would be a continual publication of the libel as a result of the need to check the will
whenever a transfer of the testator's real property is made by any of the devises. See Brown
v. Mack, 185 Misc. 368, 56 N.Y.S. 2d 910 (Surr. Ct. 1945).
3. Youmans v. Smith, 153 N.Y. 214, 47 N.E. 265 (1897); Millman v. Drew, 223 App.
Div. 691, 229 N.Y. Supp. 336 (1st Dep't 1928); Wells v. Bestrat Hotel Corp., 212 App. Div.
366, 208 N.Y. Supp. 625 (1st Dep't 1925).
4. See note 2 supra.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Roberts v. Breckon, 31 App. Div. 431, 52 N.Y. Supp. 638 (4th Dep't 1898).
8. Valentine v. Gonzales, 190 App. Div. 490, 179 N.Y. Supp. 711 (1st Dep't 1920).
9. Citizens' and Southern Nat'l Bank v. Hendricks, 176 Ga. 692, 168 S.E. 313 (1933).
The executor "was a creature or agency of the law to administer the estate, and was not the
testator's representative in the continuation or consummation of the testator's wrong." Citizens'
and Southern Nat'l Bank v. Hendricks, supra at 697, 168 S.E. at 315. In Kleinschmidt v.
Matthieu, 201 Ore. 406, 266 P. 2d 686 (1954), in a well written decision, the Supreme Court
of Oregon contended (as regards the executor) that:
1) there was no agency which dies with the deceased (it was argued that since an executor
is the agent of the testator during his lifetime, the agency derived therefrom not being coupled
with an interest dies with the death of the testator. The court rejected this theory, holding
that the executor is not an agent of the testator during the latter's lifetime.) ;
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It is uniformly held that written or oral statements made in a judicial proceeding are privileged if pertinent and they cannot be made the subject of a
libel action.10 But this defense will not avail the estate where the will is
defamatory because the testator was not a party to a judicial proceeding at the
time of its making. This is true despite the fact that the subsequent probate
proceeding is a judicial proceeding and the will is relevant and material thereto."
However, it has been held that the rule relating to privileged writings in a judicial proceeding may be validly applied to a will in which there is no apparent
purpose to injure or defame but merely an intent to insure the proper distribution of the estate and to protect it against claims by those not intended to be
benefited.' 2
The estate may make use of the defense of justification and truth as in any
other libel action and if it be pleaded and proved the estate is not liable as the
ordinary rules of libel and slander apply.13
The authorities are in conflict on the question of the survivorship of the cause
of action. The courts are confronted with the common law maxim of actio personalis moritur cum persona, which provides that if an injury was done either to
the person or property of another for which damages only could be recovered,
the action died with the person by whom the wrong was committed and no action
can be brought against his executor or administrator.1 4 The applicability of the
maxim is doubtful because of the nature of the tort of libel. No cause of action
accrues until after publication15 and publication does not result until after the
death of the testator so it would seem that no right of action existed which could
abate. Only five jurisdictions have litigated this precise question. The split is
three to two with the majority holding the maxim inapplicable and reasoning
that since no cause of action existed against the testator during his lifetime none
2) the executor does not become an agent of the court until he is appointed and letters
testamentary are issued to him; and
3) during the period between the death and the issuance of his authority, he is a mere
instrument through which the will is published.
See also Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 162 S.W. 584 (1914) ; Brown v. Mack,
185 Misc. 368, 56 N.Y.S. 2d 910 (Surr. CL 1945); Matter of Draske's Estate, 160 fIsc. 587,
290 N.Y. Supp. 581 (Surr. CL 1936); Matter of Payne, 160 Misc. 224, 290 N.Y. Supp. 407
(Surr. Ct. 1936).
10. Garr v. Selden, 4 N.Y. 91 (1850).
11. See note 9 supra.
12. Nagle v. Nagle, 316 Pa. 507, 175 At. 487 (1934). The court felt there vYas no intent
to defame. The plaintiff had litigated the question of paternity for twenty-seven years and
in four courts, with the deceased continually maintaining that he was not the plaintiff's
father. In his will the deceased claimed that he had only two children-the plaintiff not
named as one of them-and that he recognized no others. The court, in quoting Towmsend,
Libel and Slander 345 said: "The right to publish all that one may honestly consider necessary for the maintenance and protection of his rights is not confined to the proceedings in a
court of justice; it extends to every occasion upon which one is called upon to defend himself
from any charge against him." Nagle v. Nagle, supra at 512, 175 AtL at 4S9.
13. Brown v. Mack, 185 Misc. 368,56 N.Y.S. 2d 910 (Surr. CL 1945).
14. Matter of Payne, 160 Misc. 224, 290 N.Y. Supp. 407 (Surr. CL 1936).
15. Schaller v. Miller, 173 App. Div. 998, 159 N.Y. Supp. 1140 (4th Dep't 1916).
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abated upon his death. 16 The minority does not squarely meet the argument of
the majority but reasons that because the death of the testator intervenes between the wrongful act and the injury the liability of the testator and his
estate is interred with him.' 7 The maxim has been widely criticized.' 8 The
Legislature of the State of New York, upon the recommendation of the Law
Revision Commission amended section 118 of the Decedent Estate Law so as to
nullify the effect of the maxim. 19 In 1942 a second paragraph was added to
section 118 which clarified the effect of the section in regard to an action against
the estate for an injury to the person. 20 Under the law of New York an attack
upon the reputation of another is a personal injury within the meaning of that
enactment. 21 It is safe to conclude therefore, with one doubtful exception, 22 that
a cause of action does arise because of defamatory statements made in a will
which in a minority of jurisdictions will be held. to abate upon the death of the
testator. The better view is that the liability of the testator falls upon his estate
and that damages may be recovered by the one defamed, provided however,
publication has occurred.
THE LiAB.rLry OF THE EXECUTOR
It has already been noted, and it is uniformly held, that the executor is not
the agent of the testator for the consummation of the libel. 23 The distinction
between the liability of the executor in his executory capacity and in his capacity
as a private person has not always been clearly borne in mind. 24 The following
discussion will concern only his susceptibility to suit in his individual capacity.
As a general rule, all who participate in the procurement, composition, and
publication of a libel are legally responsible for their acts. 25 The author of the
16. Kleinschmidt v. Matthieu, 201 Ore. 406, 266 P. 2d 686 (1954); Harris v. Nashvillo
Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 162 S.W. 584 (1914); Gallagher's Estate, 10 Pa. Dist. 733 (1901).
17. Carver v. Morrow, 213 S.C. 199, 48 S.E. 2d 814 (1948); Citizens and Southern Natl
Bank v. Hendricks, 176 Ga. 642, 168 S.E. 313 (1932).
18. Matter of Payne, 160 Misc. 224, 290 N.Y. Supp. 407 (Surr. Ct. 1936); Report, N.Y.
Law Revision Commission, 1935, at 159, 161-62.
19. N.Y. Decedent Estate Law § 118 (1942). "No cause of action for injury to person
or property shall be lost because of the death of the person liable for the injury. For any
injury an action may be brought or continued against the executor or administrator of tho
deceased person. ..."
20. N.Y. Decedent Estate Law § 118 (1942). This was added so as "to make clear that
under § 118 of the Decedent Estate Law an action against an executor or administrator, for
injury to person or property or for wrongful death, is not defeated because the tort-feasor
died before the occurance of such injuries or wrongful death." Report, N.Y. Law Revision
Commission, 1942, at 777, note.
21. New York General Construction Law § 37a (1949) provides that the right to suo
for libel is a separate right, and may not be joined with an action for malicious prosecution
or false arrest. Fulton v. Ingalls, 165 App. Div. 323, 151 N.Y. Supp. 130 (2d Dep't 1914),
aff'd, 214 N.Y. 665 (1915) ; N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 258 (Supp. 1949).
22. Carver v. Morrow, 213 S.C. 199, 48 S.E. 2d 814 (1948).
23. See note 9 supra.
24. Brown v. Mack, 185 Misc. 368, 56 N.Y.S. 2d 910 (Surr. Ct. 1945).
25. Seelman, The Law of Libel and Slander in the State of New York § 141 at 126 (1st
ed. 1933).
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libel need not himself perform all the necessary operations to bring the libel to
fruition. 26 Therefore, if another imparts the information to still another he is
equally liable. What then of the liability of the executor for filing the will with
the court and for communicating the contents thereof to interested parties prior
to probate? If it is the act of the executor in propounding the will which is relied
on to complete the offense and afford a recovery against him, such reliance must
fail because he is an agent of the law.27 It is his duty to file the will for probate
and suppression would be a criminal act.28 In New York the filing of the will
is made mandatory by section 137 of the Surrogate's Court Act.' And the
mantle of absolute privilege shields the executor from liability when he publishes
the will by offering it for probate. The instrument then becomes the subject of
a judicial proceeding to which the executor is a party and consequently he is
immune from suit. 3 The soundness of this rule cannot be doubted for if publication is made mandatory through the act of filing, liability should not attach
because of such compliance with the law.
Let us assume that prior to the filing of the will the executor furnished copies
thereof to the legatees and heirs at law. Although this certainly is publication,
the cases intimate that during the period between the death of the testator and
the appointment of the executor the latter is a mere instrument through which
publication results. 31 Should the executor refuse to send requested copies to
interested persons after the filing of the will, such refusal would be an empty
and futile gesture since they could easily be obtained from the clerk of the court.
Indeed, the propriety of such a refusal would be doubtful, as a dispute arising
upon the probate proceeding would make them necessary parties. They would
then have an absolute right to such copies and the executor would have accomplished nothing by his refusal.m It would seem that if the copies were distributed
such action would be privileged since it can be inferred that the distribution of
copies of a will to interested parties is similar to the distribution of printed
26. Newell, Slander and Libel § 176, at 220 (4th ed. -).
27. See note 9 supra.
28. Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 162 S.W. 584 (1914); Matter of Draske's
Estate, 160 Misc. 589, 290 N.Y. Supp. 581 (Surr. Ct. 1936); N.Y. Surrogate's Court Act
§ 137 (1914) ;N.Y. Penal Law 2052 (1910).

29. "Whenever it shall appear... that any person has destroyed, retained, [or] concealed
a will or testinentary instrument of decedent... the court must make an order requiring
the respondent to attend and be examined...
30. Carver v. Morrow, 213 S.C. 199, 48 S.E. 2d 814 (1948); Brown v. Mlack, 185 Misc.
368, 56 N.Y.S. 2d 910 (Surr. Ct. 1945). See also Chapman v. Dick, 197 App. Div. 551, 188
N.Y. Supp. 861 (2d Dep't 1921), in which Justice Young stated, "I think that ... the rule
relating to absolute privilege is sufficiently broad to extend to all matter otherwise libelous
alleged or introduced in an action which, although ineffectual as a defense, may by any
possibility, under any circumstances, and at some stage of the proceeding be or become
material or pertinent." Chapman v. Dick, supra at 559, 188 N.Y. Supp. at 866.
31. Kleinschmidt v. Matthieu, 201 Ore. 406, 266 P. 2d 686 (1954) ; See note 9 supra. See
also Brown v. Mlack, 185 Misc. 36S, 56 N.Y.S. 2d 910 (Surr. Ct. 1945); Matter of Draske's
Estate, 160 Misc. 589, 290 N.Y. Supp. 581 (Surr. Ct. 1936).
32. Brown v. Mack, supra note 31.
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questions containing libelous matter to prospective witnesses in a disbarment
proceeding, and the distribution in that case was held to be privileged.0 3
Another aspect of the liability of the executor which merits discussion is
whether or not it is incumbent upon the executor to petition the court to delete
the defamatory matter from the will as admitted to probate. A discussion of
this question follows.
THE POWER TO DELETE OR OMIT FROM PROBATE

Must the subject of the testator's scorn remain mute and stand idly by while
possible irreparable damage is done to his reputation through the publication of
the defamatory matter upon probate? To state it another way is his only recourse an action for damages or is he entitled to other relief?
The earliest reported case dealing with this problem held that an action to
expunge the libelous matter from the will must fail, because a court does not
have the authority upon an unsupported verbal application to expunge or strike
out any part of a will, especially where the will is holographic. 84 It was noted
that a similar application had been made and similarly denied before the court's
predecessor.3 5 Other courts have held that a motion to expunge or strike out will
not be granted.3 6 The validity of this rule is dampened slightly by the relative
dearth of decisions, the precise point apparently having been presented to the
courts in but a few cases in 130 years.37 However, its companion motion to have
the defamatory matter deleted from the copy of the will presented for probate
and from the copy retained by the court has met with greater success and more
judicial treatment. Such a motion has been before the courts on thirteen different
occasions, the first being twenty years after the denial of the first application
to expunge.38 The English court there held that the objectionable matter will be
omitted from the probate copy only, but will remain in the original will. In six
subsequent cases the English courts reached the same conclusion, namely, that
the courts have the power to deny probate to defamatory matter found in a
will.3 9 Only one other jurisdiction, New York, has decided the question. The
New York decisions are in complete accord with the English authorities, in holding that a motion to delete defamatory matter in a will may be entertained
before probate.40 The rationale behind the decisions is to further the purpose
33. Youmans v. Smith, 153 N.Y. 214,47 N.E. 265 (1897).
34. Curtis v. Curtis, 3 Addams Eccl. Rep. 33, 162 Eng. Reprint 393 (1825).
35. Ibid. Allusion was made to a prior application, but the case apparently was never
officially reported.
36. Matter of Meyer, 72 Misc. 566, 131 N.Y. Supp. 27 (Surr. Ct. 1911); Re Maxwell, 14
L.T.R. 471 (1929); Curtis v. Curtis, 3 Addams Eccl. Rep. 33, 162 Eng. Reprint 393 (1825).
37. See note 36 supra.
38. Goods of Wartnaby, I Rob. Eccl. 423, 163 Eng. Reprint 1088 (1846).
39. Estate of Caie, 43 T.L.R. 697 (1927); Estate of Heywood, 114 L.T.R. 375 (1915);
In the Goods of White, 111 L.T.R. 413 (1914); In the Goods of Honywood L.R., 2 P. & D.
254 (1871); Marsh v. Marsh, 164 Eng. Reprint 845 (1860); Goods of Wartnaby, I Rob.
EccL. 423, 163 Eng. Reprint 1088 (1846).
40. In re Croker's Will, 201 Misc. 264, 105 N.Y.S. 2d 190 (Surr. Ct. 1951); Matter of
Payne, 160 Misc. 224, 290 N.Y. Supp. 407 (Surr. Ct. 1936); Matter of Draske's Estate, 160
Misc. 589, 290 N.Y. Supp. 581 (Surr. Ct. 1936); Matter of Spieden, 128 Misc. 899, 221 N.Y.
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of the testator which is, of course, to benefit the beneficiaries. Any act by which
the court could conserve the assets of the estate would benefit the beneficiaries
and would, therefore, further the purpose of the testator. By granting a motion for deletion of libelous matter in a will the court would be protecting the
estate from a suit for libel by the one defamed and the consequent diminution
of assets. 41 There has been some question in New York as to whether or not
filing constitutes publication prior to the granting of the motion to delete and
the question has not been uniformly resolved. It has been held that publication
has resulted from the filing of the will but that the subsequent deletion will
materially reduce the damages arising therefrom. On the other hand, a later
decision stated that if the motion to omit from probate is granted no publication
results. 43 As both these cases are entitled to equal weight, and since no appeal
was taken from either decision the resolution of the question has been postponed.
Both the New York and English courts which have granted the motion have
been impressed by the fact that in none of the cases was the matter deleted from
the probate copy dispositive.4 It was mere excess verbiage not at all necessary
to carry out the testamentary intent. It is not inconceivable, however, that a
situation might arise where the defamatory matter has some bearing on the
testamentary intent and was inserted to protect the distribution of the estate to
those intended to be benefited. In such a case the motion for deletion should be
carefully weighed against the advantages to be gained by allowing the matter
to remain. If the matter be clearly material to the validity of the will it should
be admitted to probate, even though forcing the estate to run the risk of liability
to the one defamed. 45 The courts, impressed by the solemnity of the instrument
containing the libel, are slow to exercise their right to delete. There being no
statutory direction, the power is generally held to be discretionary 0 but one
decision would indicate that it is the duty of the court to exercise the power
where the words are dearly defamatory since its inclusion was mere surplusage
and should not be perpetuated by recordation. 4 7 The aspersion cast by the
testator must be of such a nature as to appear grave in the opinion of the court
before the motion to delete will be granted.48 What will appear sufficiently grave
Supp. 223 (Surr. Ct. 1926); Matter of Meyer, 72 Misc. 566, 131 N.Y. Supp. 27 (Surr. Ct.
1911); In re Bomar's Will, 18 N.Y. Supp. 214 (Surr. Ct. 1892).
41. Matter of Draske's Estate, supra note 40.
42. Brown v. Mack, 185 Mjsc. 368, 56 N.Y.S. 2d 910 (Surr. Ct. 1945).
43. In re Croker's Will, 201 MIsc. 264, 105 N.Y.S. 2d 190 (Suer. Ct. 1951).
44. Matter of Spieden, 128 Misc. 899, 221 N.Y. Supp. 223 (Surr. Ct. 1926); Re Maxwell,
14 L.T.R. 471 (1929). In Matter of Spieden, Surrogate Foley contended that there is no
compulsion upon a court to admit to probate defamatory statements possessing no disposi-

tive value, but, on the contrary, .. . .the surrogate possesses complete power to exclude
objectionable matter...." Matter of Spieden, supra at 900D,221 N.Y. at 224.
45.

In re Croker's Will, 201 Misc. 264, 105 N.Y.S. 2d 190 (Suer. CL 1951); Brown v.

Mack, 185 Misc. 368, 56 N.Y.S. 2d 910 (Surr. Ct. 1945) where it was argued that that which
is the will of the testator cannot be treated in the same manner as that which is mere surplusage; see also Nagle v. Nagle, 316 Pa. 507, 175 At. 487 (1934).
46. See note 43 supra.
47.

In re Croker's Will, 201 Misc. 264, 105 N.Y.S. 2d 190 (Suer. CL 1951).

48. Matter of Meyer, 72 Misc. 566, 131 N.Y. Supp. 27 (Sur. CL 1911). The English
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to the courts does not necessarily coincide with what normally would be held to
constitute a libelous statement in a civil action. 49 It is clear, however, that a
mere admonition or exhortation to perform or refrain from performing a certain
act is not sufficient.5 0 If the consent of all interested parties to the deletion can
be obtained the English courts will be roused to action more quickly. 5"
It would seem that anyone interested in the conservation of the estate can
make the motion, but most frequently it is made by the executor 2 and less
frequently by the one defamed. 53 In one unique instance the motion was made
by the military authorities seeking to delete vital military information from
the holographic will of a serviceman. 54 The proper procedure is by motion made

upon the probate proceedings, and not by objection to the probate of the
instrument. 55

The reserved question of the executor's duty to petition the court to delete
the defamatory matter has received no judicial treatment. The courts do hold
that he has a right to make such motion, 58 and also hold that he is absolutely
privileged when he presents the will for probate,57 but are silent on the issue of
his liability for neglecting to move for the deletion of the defamatory matter
during the probate proceedings. An answer might be suggested by the opinion
in a New York case holding the executor absolutely privileged for presenting

the will for probate after the court has eliminated those portions which are
defamatory.58

CONCLUSION

It would seem clear that if publication results upon the filing of the instrument
for probate subsequent deletion of the defamatory matter pursuant to motion
courts that admit the power are in accord with this view. Also to that effect see Matter of
Draske's Estate, 160 Misc. 587, 290 N.Y. Supp. 581 (Surr. Ct. 1936).
49. Matter of Meyer, supra note 48; In the Goods of Honywood, L.R. 2 P. & D. 2S1
(1871) ; Marsh v. Marsh, 1 Sw. &Tr. 533, 164 Eng. Reprint 845 (1860).
50. In the Goods of Honywood, supra note 49.
51. Marsh v. Marsh, 1 Sw. & Tr. 533, 164 Eng. Reprint 845 (1860). But see Curtis
v. Curtis, 3 Addams Eccl. Rep. 33, 162 Eng. Reprint 393 (1825), where consent of all parties
had been obtained, but the request to strike out was denied.
52. Matter of Draske's Estate, 160 Misc. 587, 290 N.Y. Supp. 581 (Surr. Ct. 1936);
Matter of Payne, 160 Misc. 224, 290 N.Y. Supp. 407 (Surf. Ct. 1936); In the Goods of
White, 111 L.T.R. 413 (1914).
53. Re Maxwell, 14 L.T.R. 471 (1929); Curtis v. Curtis, 3 Addams Eccl. Rep. 331 162
Eng. Reprint 393 (1825).
54. Estate of Heywood, 114 L.T.R. 375 (1915).
55. Matter of Spieden, 128 Misc. 899, 221 N.Y. Supp. 223 (Surf. Ct. 1926).
56. See note 51 supra.
57. See note 30 supra.
58. Matter of Payne, 160 Misc. 224, 290 N.Y. Supp. 407 (Surr. Ct. 1936). This does not
in fact answer the question, and at present it is open to conjecture. Surrogate Wingate alludes
to it in his comprehensive opinion in Matter of Draske's Estate, 160 Misc. 589, 290 N.Y. Supp.
583 (Sur. Ct. 1936), but found neither an answer nor a need to answer it himself. It may
be argued that as a result of the executor's ability to petition for deletion, a failure to do
so would be an act of negligence for which a cause of action would accrue to the one defamed,
or possibly to the devisees due to the shrinkage of the estate following a libel suit. Obviously,
with the dearth of judicial decision on that point, the foregoing is speculation.

